

KAPOK

ANALYSIS of COOKEE TRAFFIC

1 December 1951

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCESMETHODSEXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

KAPOK

DESENSITIZED
11/18/03

1 December 1951

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~KAPOK~~

Enclosure to MGMA 07689

REDSOX/CAPSTAN/AERONAUT

SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF COOKEE TRAFFIC

Reference: MUNI 5852

1. The failure of Field to respond to the crypto challenge, and his earlier failure to recognize the Case Officer challenge have brought the shortcomings and inconsistencies of Cookee traffic more clearly into focus. It is proposed herein to discuss the traffic in detail (dwelling on these basic inconsistencies) and insofar as possible, draw some conclusions from them.

2. In addition to failing to respond clean to either challenge, the messages from the field, upon close scrutiny, warrant the following observations:

a. The content of the traffic, which although on surface appraisal appears to be good, gives us very little information not already available to us;

b. References to movement and partisan courier communications are full of contradictions and inconsistencies;

c. Steve has not participated in the traffic, directly or indirectly.

d. The explanation of the two months which transpired between dispatch and coming on the air is unsatisfactory; and there is a complete lack of explanation of the six-weeks' break in the traffic (26 June-5 August), subsequent to which Field has been on the air with amazing regularity. ✓

e. The fact is that most of the main inconsistencies referred to below revolve around the statements appearing in the first four messages and the inconsistent, if not contradictory, comments in subsequent messages;

f. There is a disparity between the request for a printing press for propaganda action and the reported conditions under which such action would have to be carried out;

g. There is complete disparity between the reception plan agreed on with Jack prior to his departure and that described by him;

h. After a faltering start, Jack has been on the air with astonishing regularity.

3. As cited Para. 2, Reference, control seems to be indicated by the lack of detailed specific information which Jack knew we desired. If it is true that Jack is so isolated in the woods, and his colleagues are so hampered by repres- sions, etc., that they cannot acquire detailed specific information on any one subject, it appears likely that they would at the very least have access to rumors concerning general conditions in the country. On three separate occasions we asked Field for general information on conditions in country as well as "rumors of unrest, military activity", etc. These requests have gone unanswered. You will note in the breakdown below (see Attachment 1) that almost without exception we have received replies to our specific questions (usually with a bare minimum

This lack of specifics may indicate 1. Jack not controlled but afraid & worried
2. Jack fear other sources in area which release
3. Jack specific data

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~DESENSITIZED~~

3. However clever, iron in world seems correct, specific
KAPOK material to build up our confidence in Jack!

KAPOK

- 2 -

Enclosure to MGMA

07689

~~TOP SECRET~~

of information)--but it is only by implication that questions of a general nature (which we would be in a position to verify from knowledge gained from the repatriates and []) have been answered. Attachment 2 gives a breakdown of "voluntary" information which Jack has forwarded during the five months he has been on the air. It is not a formidable collection of vital information.

4. The failure of [] to procure and report even minimal general information is closely related to the inconsistencies revolving around the reported complete breakdown in communications between the partisan units. You will note that in Jack's earlier messages, in which he reports the disruption of communications "within the region," he also reports the sending of people to neighboring areas, Prussia, Kaunas, and the Lithuanian-Polish border. These reports are not in keeping with later messages in which he reports the refusal of some contact men to carry out their assignments and his apparent complete inability to learn anything about anything, since "no documents are reaching the Zalgiris Detachment," etc. His reports of sending a letter to Stan "through contact men;" of Steve's departure to attempt to make contact with Tauras Region Headquarters; of the "arrival of a contact man" with word that Steve had been killed--are all incompatible with the reported complete breakdown of communications as evidenced by the dearth of even most basic information either from the country as a whole or from his immediate surrounding area.

5. This basic inconsistency between reported breakdown of communications and what it is possible to learn and transmit is pointed up by the detailed information concerning the death of Steve (Msg. #11). This information had to be "wheedled" out of field; but since this was information which we had more or less insisted upon having, detailed responses were ultimately (although piecemeal) forthcoming. That it is possible to procure information is presumably here verified. Altoniskiai (the reported place of Steve's death) is approximately 15 km from the DZ selected by Jack for reception of new people. Jack's hideout is reportedly a night's march from the DZ, which together we can assume approximate 25-30 km. If Jack was able to obtain the details of Steve's death from the distance involved in this instance, it does not seem unreasonable that he could discover the size, activity, etc., of the closest reported partisan detachment, which is approximately the same distance in another direction from where he is. In this regard, a discussion with the [] and [] elicited an immediate and unanimous comment to the effect that it was "unbelievable" that Jack's "detachment" could maintain no contact with even its closest neighbors or to know nothing whatsoever of a Supreme Command.

*lent to
united
now that*

6. Message #1 lays the groundwork for another inconsistency in regard to contact with other units. It is there reported that the drop was made about 7 km SE of the designated spot. Study of the map indicates that to have dropped 7 km SE of the designated spot would put them very close to Papilvis Village (which is there reported). Message #2 mentions Agurkiskiai, where the second set, ciphers, and commo plans were buried and where "everything was found in order." Agurkiskiai is ca. 10 km NW of where Jack says he and Steve dropped and is ca. 7 km NW of the DZ delineated by Jack in Message #14. If the points and distances provided by Jack are accurate, the container which was dropped with them is presumably buried within a radius of 3-4 km of the selected DZ. His report in Message #4 that they are "attempting to re-establish contact with the

~~TOP SECRET~~

KAPOK

15APR

- 3 -

Enclosure to MGMA

07689

~~TOP SECRET~~

Birutenai Detachment, in whose area the container is buried," and his subsequent failure to mention the matter again seems quite strange since Jack's "contact man" (Msg. #15) lives only 2-3 km from the alleged site of the burial. (You will note that there is no further mention of either the container or the Birutenai Detachment in subsequent traffic.) Since Jack has indicated that either he or his colleagues have been active in setting up the new DZ, it is hard to believe that efforts to at least recover the container so near at hand would not have been made and reported.

7. The request for a portable printing press has provided additional questions. In the over-all view, the stated desire for a printing press as being "necessary to strengthen the morale of the partisans and their supporters" is not at all compatible with a partisan detachment to all intents and purposes completely cut off from outside contacts. The question immediately comes to mind: Just who would be circularized with this propaganda material? The very wording of the messages dealing with the subject of the press indicates rather strong pressure, which is not explained later by Jack with reasoned statements, but circumvented with vague and uninformative excuses. For example, in Msg. #12, after reporting that the press was necessary for his colleagues, he says: "As compensation I can count on their help in all of my other activities, etc." Since we had figured that Jack had been forced to use the press as a bargaining point with his partisan colleagues, this reasoning made some sense. However, he goes on to say: "... it is not possible to avoid (propaganda) completely under the conditions at hand." In Msg. #17, Jack says he agrees with our viewpoint concerning the dangers of propaganda activity but "nevertheless, under existing conditions, it is not conceivable to completely withdraw from it." Field fails completely either to justify or elaborate these "conditions at hand" and our fears concerning compartmentalization of the two activities have not been allayed by the subsequent picture Jack paints of conditions under which propaganda would be carried on. If control is assumed, such circumstances might tempt one to venture that Jack's controls were anxious only to receive our most capable and knowledgeable individuals--therefore, insisting upon a printing press and a propaganda man (i.e., a man politically knowledgeable) regardless of the unsatisfactory conditions which are described. Since we have made such a point of the printing press, the responses from the [] are unsatisfactory and in their entirety open to serious question.

8. It also appears to us rather strange that no request for weapons was made. Jack refers to his colleagues from time to time as "fighters"--yet he makes no mention whatsoever of any need for ammunition or weapons. We can only assume that if this is a bona fide resistance detachment, there would be need for weapons--if not for offensive action, at least for self-defense,-- or some other direct support in supplies, for instance, drugs or shoes, which are very difficult to obtain, even with rubles. The barest minimum he would ask for, it would appear, is for new weapons for the two men who live with him in the bunker. And too, the twice-iterated request for sizable sums of rubles, although doubtless valid under any circumstances, can hardly be justified by the returns, for even assuming that 50,000 rubles were lost with Steve, we have very little indeed to show for the other 50,000 Jack had.

9. Another unanswerable question which has plagued us throughout the course of the traffic is the complete absence of Steve in it. Message #1 reports their separation on 19 May, one month to the day after arrival. [] feels very strongly that, at the very least, Steve would have written out a message for

~~TOP SECRET~~

15APR

KAPOK

- 4 -

closure to MGMA 07689

~~TOP SECRET~~

transmission by Jack when he was able to come on the air. Both were instructed to send and Steve would have had a month prior to separation during which to write a message or at least give Jack some verbal greeting, acknowledgment or instructions to send.

10. In actuality, the nearly two months which transpired between dispatch and coming on the air are rather cursorily explained away. It was due to "uncertain conditions" that Steve and Jack separated on 19 May. It was due to "danger of movement" which prevented checking back for the container. It was "uncertain conditions" which made it necessary to stop sending temporarily." Whereas earlier there was danger of movement, Steve left to make contact with the headquarters of a region and persons were being sent to various and sundry places both near and far. Later traffic speaks of the failure of contact men to carry out assignments, while at the same time six men are to assist in a dangerous reception committee, and one additional person has been selected to act as a contact man. There has been no indication that Jack has changed his locale during the course of the traffic; however, whereas it was necessary earlier to "stop sending," the same locale now offers the possibility to be on the air seven different times during the course of a three weeks' period (31 October-20 November).

11. Two additional points which might also be mentioned are:

a. Jack's plan for a reception varies in almost every respect with the plan provided him by [] and Jack has totally failed to explain why he has changed the pre-arranged plan; in fact, has failed to make any reference to it.

b. Commo personnel report that Jack puts out such a strong signal that it is possible to hear it even without earphones on the opposite side of the room. His messages have had almost perfect readability throughout; and in addition, he handles the circuit in a competent, calm manner, indicating that at least while transmitting he is not under a strain or in nervous condition.

12. Para. 3, Reference: If Jack is, and has been under the direct control of an MGB Case Officer, it is hard to tell whether Jack or the control is making the most of the situation. The fact that--the first four messages excepted--there has never been any worthwhile or unsolicited information (see Attachment 2) coming out over the link indicates that a tight screening of messages has been maintained. This is the type of screening which presumably only close direct Case Officer control would be able to insure. Such close control of information, however, is not entirely compatible with the fact that the controlling Case Officer allowed both of the challenges to go unanswered, while at the same time condoning the "Girenas" inconsistency mentioned below. One would tend to assume that if Jack were really broken, the Case Officer would have got at least one of the compromise signals from him; Jack, however, is an intelligent individual: he did have some leeway and "room to maneuver" in both challenges; and quite possibly may have succeeded evading disclosure of compromise signals by some sequence of lies of which we are obviously unaware but which explain the numerous inconsistencies in the messages we have noted.

~~TOP SECRET~~

KAPOK

KAPOK

- 5 -

Enclosure to MGMA 07689

~~TOP SECRET~~

13. In the first four messages (which are very characteristic of Jack and have a striking air of genuiness) he names names; cites locales; indicates knowledgeability concerning the whereabouts of Stan; the Tauras Region, LLKS headquarters, general conditions, etc., and makes mention of Frank and Joe. In these four messages he is abiding by instructions and doing just what we would want and expect of him. Since the subject matter of these four messages form the basis of the chief arguments for control, either in omission or contradiction in subsequent traffic, it would appear that they are the key to the question of control. On the basis of the traffic pattern and subject matter, Jack appears to have been free until after the fourth message. If that is the case, then, indeed, we must read the many inconsistencies and contradictions in the subsequent traffic as clues to Jack's real status, and as parts of a story which Jack may have concocted to protect his previous traffic, his compromise and danger signals, and indicate to us control. The use of "Girenas" in one of the messages and his later failure to use it again may be an example of such a clue..

14. Jack's failure to mention Birutenai Detachment in any message subsequent to the fourth, is perhaps significant since he did mention a group similar to the Zalgiris Detachment in Message #18. This is the Gelezinis Vilkas (the "Iron Wolf") Detachment, the reporting of which is the first instance wherein Jack failed to repeat a proper name. In this connection, since the name of "Birutenai" is associated with the container dropped with Steve and Jack, it may also be of considerable significance that in Message #16, Jack says that "as far as other supplies are concerned, it is enough to have what we had in our personal bags and on ourselves." It would not be unreasonable to take this as an indication that Jack has kept the fact of the existence of the container from his controls completely, hence the avoidance of any mention of the container, Birutenai Detachment, and other subjects raised in the first four messages.

15. If we assume MGB control subsequent to Msg. #4, it is still difficult to explain the complete absence of Steve in the traffic. However, an explanation may lie in the following circumstance: A careful study of the first four messages gives strong indication that almost from the moment Steve and Jack hit the ground they were hunted men. This could, in fact, explain why it took eight days to cover the distance to the first contact point. The genuine urgency of "uncertain conditions" in Msg. #1; "the danger of movement" in Msg. #2; and again "uncertain conditions necessitating sending temporarily" in Msg. #4 give cause to suspect that the greater part of those two months was spent by both Steve and Jack keeping themselves alive and hidden. In addition to providing an explanation of the six-weeks break in the traffic (during which time Jack was presumably apprehended and "broken"), the premise of MGB control after the fourth message provides relatively good explanations for the over-all content of the traffic, and the inconsistencies appearing in the traffic after the first four messages. Before departure, Steve made it very clear that he would kill himself rather than fall into the hands of the enemy. Jack, on the other hand, limited his assurances in this regard to "doing his best." If Jack did, in fact, succumb to MGB capture, he has done everything possible to inform us of his controlled status and is in fact "doing his best."

~~TOP SECRET~~

KAPOK

KAPOK
TOP SECRET

16. Para. 4, Reference: Although the many inconsistencies of the traffic and the danger signals are perhaps best explained by this theory, the mechanics of completely sealing Jack off from any sort of information would be hard to imagine. Under this theory, Jack has presumable access to a free radio--but is controlled either by the extreme limitations of access to information or is being required to submit his texts for approval prior to transmission. The inconsistency of the "breakdown of communications" could be explained by the fact that the contact men of the detachment carry out only those assignments for Jack (or his control) which will be of no harm to them and of little real value to us. The ability to get details on Steve's death would be a very good example of the sort of thing which the contact men would be able to perform.

17. Since the first four messages indicate cleanliness, the explanation of absense of Steve in the messages would remain the same. Both Jack and he were so busy evading the security forces that there was no time for them to send a message before Steve had departed--and he counted on Jack to do the transmitting --when possible--while he proceeded to make contact with the neighboring regional headquarters. The nature of the replies to queries regarding the advisability of the printing press would tend to indicate the type of non-professional partisan control here indicated, since it is assumed that an MGB Case Officer would have given more adequate answers in allaying our fears re compartmentalization, and the entire question of advisability to engage in propaganda work.

18. This theory offers the only satisfactory explanation of a change in the spirit of messages after a certain point that close scrutiny reveals. An early analysis of the traffic (up to and including #8 and prior to the discovery that no one here knew who "Girenas" was) had failed to convince us of control. Not only were those messages apparently in keeping with Jack's character and briefing, but they were also in keeping with our cautious admonitions to work on a long-term basis, etc. Messages subsequent to Msg. #8 showed a characteristic sense of optimism and what appeared to be a surge of activity. We experienced fears at the time that, lacking the steady influence of Steve, Jack would (again characteristically) try to do too much. It is conceivable that Jack was fed a great build-up of the potential of the group with which he was working, but then he gradually became aware of the notional set-up of which he was a part. Whereas Jack's early messages were not merely characteristic of him in their structure, but also revealed personality and emotion (for instance, some enthusiasm); his later messages are matter-of-fact and spiritless, if not lackadaisical.

19. In summary, the fact that the [] did not respond properly to challenges leaves us no choice but to assume that Jack is under control. The inconsistencies and contradictions, as well as some of the acts of commission or omission (referred to above) in the messages, give very strong support to this assumption of control. However, the question as to the nature or type of this control cannot be answered at this time. We tend to believe that it is direct MGB Case Officer control. We will make every effort to have the Field reveal itself more clearly on this score and certainly will make a simultaneous effort to keep this W/T link active indefinitely. We request your full views and recommendations on handling the link and the general lines of content our outgoing traffic should reflect.

TOP SECRET

KAPOK

KAPOR
~~TOP SECRET~~

Attachment 1 to MGM-A- 07683

QUESTIONS TO JACK

WHETHER ANSWERED

2 July

1. General request for political and military information.
2. Their own future plans, location.

14 Aug, 10 Sep

20-25 August

3. Partisan organization.
4. Specific location, name unit, persons assisting, legal status.
5. Re treason in Steve's death.
6. Details re Steve.
7. Who brought word of Steve's death, general conditions, unrest, military activity.

25 Sep
25 Sep
5 Oct
5 Oct

27 September

8. Details on request for help.
9. Type propaganda work.
10. Separation propaganda from intelligence collection.

13, 23 Oct
13 Oct
13 Oct

9 October

11. Details re Zalgiris Unit.
12. Details re other units, HQ, if existent.
13. Legal and black status.
14. Where did Steve perish.

13 Nov
13, 15 Nov
15 Nov
15 Nov

17 October

15. Re advisability printing presses and leaflets.
16. Guarded challenge re Mike.
17. Details re drop--how carry out--how many.
18. Supplies and documentation.

30 Oct
30 Oct
30 Oct
30 Oct

Original 12 November, repeated ca 17 November

19. Actually a farmhouse on DZ--who occupies.
20. Color type signal light at orientation point.
21. Color type lights to be used reception.
22. Role of contact man--can supply more?
23. When ready receive.

19 Nov

19 Nov
19 Nov
19 Nov

~~TOP SECRET~~

KAPOR

KAPOK

~~TOP SECRET~~

Attachment 2 to MGM-A-07689

VOLUNTARY INFORMATION

16 June

Landing and post-drop information; first contact point, reason for delay, contact with partisans; separation from Steve; immediate roundups, danger of movement.

25 June

Depletion of partisan ranks; breakdown communications; further reasons departure Steve.

26 June

Where settled; attempts reestablish contact with Birutenai detachment; Stan alive beginning February; no news Frank, Joe; uncertain conditions necessitating stop sending; greetings.

5 August

News of Steve's death.

14 August

Reports attempt contact Stan; acting on basis his own decisions.

~~TOP SECRET~~

KAPOK